PROJETO DE IRRIGAÇÃO SANTA CRUZ DO APODI SOB A PERSPECTIVA DA VIOLAÇÃO AO DIREITO INTERNACIONAL DOS DIREITOS HUMANOS.

The article analyzes the discursive establishment of the miracle in the religious sensibilities of the population of the Nuevo Reino de Granada, the Spanish American colony Empire, based in Bogota, during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He turned to the identification of miraculous events both in the territory as the reports and descriptions of them are made in relationships or travel diaries written by clerics of different regular and secular orders and a typology of the facts identified was performed. (...) The methodology was oriented from three views of miracles: the discursive construction from the social appropriation of these phenomena, the popular acceptance of an unexpected event and symbolic configuration that these were in the process of social cohesion between this and other provinces of Nueva Granada territory; also four categories of miracles were identified: those of an image on itself, assistance, physical and thaumaturgic; these, in turn, were grouped as impersonal, individual or collective. (shrink)

Não há dúvidas de que o caminho da descolonização é a eclosão do múltiplo em suas emergências de autorias, saberes, estratégias de luta. Ao revelar as fissuras nos mecanismos cristalizados de dominação, da invenção do outro subalterno, são acionadas reapropriações heterogêneas dos legados coloniais. Os movimentos de resistência reterritorializam a memória em disputa, desvendam a relação intrínseca entre memória e território e proporcionam leituras não hegemônicas das histórias e imaginários coloniais; recompõem trajetórias e reconfiguram nas narrativas e ritualidades as relações (...) entre pessoas, corpos e com a alteridade. (shrink)

Education aims at the integral development of the person. However, there are few proposals that conceptualize ways to implement this desideratum. In the Portuguese context, we had the paradigmatic case of the Manuel Ferreira Patrício Cultural School. MFP differentiates itself by advocating for integral education that establishes an essential connection between the teaching, extra-lecture, interactive and ecological components of the school, highlighting the multidimensionalities of education: personality, culture, methodologies, curriculum, resources, educators, and pedagogical organization.

The main goal of this paper will be to analyze the relationship between the phenomenon of conceptual relativity and the speaking-sensitive semantics. My paper will be divided into three parts. In the first part I will present Putnam's the phenomenon of conceptual relativity, in the second part I will exhibit the main ideas that characterize the speaking-sensitive semantics defended by Putnam and, finally, in the last part I will connect Putnam's semantics with the doctrine of conceptual relativity.

The main aim of this brief paper is to present in which sense both Putnam's internal realism and his natural realism are realist. In order to do that I will take into consideration the notion of "reality" that Putnam uses in his defense of his internalist perspective as well in his present natural realism. Although there exist significant differences between Putnam's two different realist stances, the notion of "reality" present in each of them remains the same. In this paper I (...) will clarify what Putnam understands by that notion. (shrink)

The case study is presented in the title: Hrabanus Maurus’s In honorem sanctae crucis and Berthold of Nuremberg’s two-part work Liber de misteriis et laudibus sancta crucis and the supplement Liber de misteriis et laudibus interemerate Virginis genitrices Dei et Domini nostril Ihesu ) are confronted and dissected; and the use of the word “transformation” is key to the analytical and interpretive possibilities concerning the medieval formulas the author presents. Close to five hundred years separate the carmina figurata of the (...) Carolingian abbot and the text-images of the Dominican lector and both follow on antique traditions. With more than two hundred pictures of diagrams and illuminations from a multitude of codices, architectural details and religious objects, Hamburger furnishes our understanding of transformation in medieval visual cultures and of the centrality of diagrams in artistic productions. (shrink)

Resumen: 1.- El axis mundi y la tópica paleolítica. 2.- Las diosas paleolíticas y el canon ovoide. 3.- El juego de la rayuela y la geometría sagrada. 4.- Las esferas celestes de Pitágoras a Ptolomeo. El modelo “matriuska”. Palabras clave: Cosmogonía paleolítica, geometría sagrada, “matriuska”, templo.

According to many, to have epistemic justification to believe P is just for it to be epistemically permissible to believe P. Others think it is for believing P to be epistemically good. Yet others think it has to do with being epistemically blameless in believing P. All such views of justification encounter problems. Here, a new view of justification is proposed according to which justification is a kind of composite normative status. The result is a view of justification that offers (...) hope of solving some longstanding epistemological problems. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly non-causal and/or mathematical, explanations explain in a way that is radically dif- ferent from the way causal explanation explain. Namely, while causal explanations explain by providing information about causal dependence, allegedly some abstract explanations explain in a way tied to the independence of the explanandum from the microdetails, or causal laws, for example. We oppose this recent trend to regard abstractions as explanatory in some sui generis way, and argue (...) that a prominent ac- count of causal explanation can be naturally extended to capture explanations that radically abstract away from microphysical and causal-nomological details. To this end, we distinguish di erent senses in which an explanation can be more or less abstract, and analyse the connection between explanations’ abstractness and their explanatory power. According to our analysis abstract explanations have much in common with counterfactual causal explanations. (shrink)

Probabilism is committed to two theses: 1) Opinion comes in degrees—call them degrees of belief, or credences. 2) The degrees of belief of a rational agent obey the probability calculus. Correspondingly, a natural way to argue for probabilism is: i) to give an account of what degrees of belief are, and then ii) to show that those things should be probabilities, on pain of irrationality. Most of the action in the literature concerns stage ii). Assuming that stage i) has been (...) adequately discharged, various authors move on to stage ii) with varied and ingenious arguments. But an unsatisfactory response at stage i) clearly undermines any gains that might be accrued at stage ii) as far as probabilism is concerned: if those things are not degrees of belief, then it is irrelevant to probabilism whether they should be probabilities or not. In this paper we scrutinize the state of play regarding stage i). We critically examine several of the leading accounts of degrees of belief: reducing them to corresponding betting behavior (de Finetti); measuring them by that behavior (Jeffrey); and analyzing them in terms of preferences and their role in decision-making more generally (Ramsey, Lewis, Maher). We argue that the accounts fail, and so they are unfit to subserve arguments for probabilism. We conclude more positively: ‘degree of belief’ should be taken as a primitive concept that forms the basis of our best theory of rational belief and decision: probabilism. (shrink)

Recently, there has been much research into conceptual engineering in connection with feminist inquiry and activism, most notably involving gender issues, but also sexism and misogyny. Our paper contributes to this research by explicating, in a principled manner, a series of other concepts important for feminist research and activism, to wit, feminist political identity terms. More specifically, we show how the popular Conceptual Spaces Framework (CSF) can be used to identify and regiment concepts that are central to feminist research, focusing (...) especially on feminism in France. According to the CSF, concepts can be represented geometrically, as regions in similarity spaces. A particular strength of the CSF framework is its empirically-focused methodology, which allows researchers to infer the boundaries of concepts from empirical data, thus eliminating the need to strongly rely on intuitions about meanings. This is shown to be especially valuable for the explication of concepts relating to feminist political identity, given that the intuitions of feminist scholars and activists about what would appear to be core concepts in the area tend to be poorly aligned or even conflicting. We report the results from an empirical categorization study conducted among French feminists and show how they support the view that the CSF can contribute to both the conceptual engineering project and our understanding of the structure of social reality. (shrink)

Objectification is a notion central to contemporary feminist theory. It has famously been associated with the work of anti-pornography feminists Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, and more recently with the work of Martha Nussbaum. However, objectification is a notion that has not yet been adequately defined. It has been used rather vaguely to refer to a broad range of cases involving, in some way or another, the treatment of a person as an object. My purpose in this paper is to (...) offer a plausible understanding of objectification. I do that by focusing on the work of four prominent thinkers: Immanuel Kant, and contemporary feminists Catharine MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin and Martha Nussbaum. Through drawing on these thinkers' conceptions of objectification, I am finally led to a more complete and coherent understanding of this notion. (shrink)

General-elimination harmony articulates Gentzen’s idea that the elimination-rules are justified if they infer from an assertion no more than can already be inferred from the grounds for making it. Dummett described the rules as not only harmonious but stable if the E-rules allow one to infer no more and no less than the I-rules justify. Pfenning and Davies call the rules locally complete if the E-rules are strong enough to allow one to infer the original judgement. A method is given (...) of generating harmonious general-elimination rules from a collection of I-rules. We show that the general-elimination rules satisfy Pfenning and Davies’ test for local completeness, but question whether that is enough to show that they are stable. Alternative conditions for stability are considered, including equivalence between the introduction- and elimination-meanings of a connective, and recovery of the grounds for assertion, finally generalizing the notion of local completeness to capture Dummett’s notion of stability satisfactorily. We show that the general-elimination rules meet the last of these conditions, and so are indeed not only harmonious but also stable. (shrink)

Este artículo estudia la interpretación del comienzo de la filosofía en términos de una correlación entre sujeto y objeto, desarrollada por el filósofo neokantiano Heinrich Rickert. En primer lugar, se reconstruyen el contexto problemático que conduce a Rickert al problema del comienzo de la filosofía y su distinción entre tres acepciones diferentes del concepto de ‘comienzo’. En segundo lugar, se ofrece una interpretación del comienzo correlacional de la filosofía como una respuesta a la paradoja formulada por Hegel en las primeras (...) páginas de la _Ciencia de la Lógica_. Finalmente, se evalúa la propuesta de un comienzo correlacional en función del proyecto general de una filosofía transcendental. (shrink)

Cet article s’interroge sur la manifestation artistique d’un motif concret y suscitant une inquiétude radicale: les faces sans visage. En étudiant les conditions plastiques et ontologiques constituantes de certaines oeuvres, en particulier de Malévitch et Brancusi, où l’on s’interroge sur les limiter de l’idée occidentale de subjectivité, on prendra en compte les influences d’auteurs comme Pic de la Mirandolle, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty ou, entre autres, Paul Ricoeur.

En suivant la notion fondamentale d’« instauration » dans ses diverses ramifications (artistique, ontologique, esthétique), cela jusqu’aux derniers textes de Souriau, on comprend que celle-ci est encore très pertinente pour les recherches actuelles, et qu’elle peut trouver à se prolonger, notamment dans une poétique et une théorie de l’action.

Ces rencontres témoignent de l'histoire des réflexions sur le cinéma dans l'optique de la philosophie depuis la démarche de G. Deleuze. Ce recueil présente une réflexion historique et théorique du rapprochement du cinéma avec la philosophie ou l'esthétique, et procède à des analyses philosophiques ou esthétiques sur tel ou tel aspect du cinéma.

Knowledge-first theories of justification are theories of justification that give knowledge priority when it comes to explaining when and why someone has justification for an attitude or an action. The emphasis of this article is on knowledge-first theories of justification for belief. As it turns out, there are a number of ways of giving knowledge priority when theorizing about justification, and what follows is a survey of more than a dozen existing options that have emerged in the early 21st century (...) since the publication of Timothy Williamson’s *Knowledge and Its Limits*. This article traces several of the general theoretical motivations that have been offered for putting knowledge first in the theory of justification. This is followed by an examination of existing knowledge-first theories of justification and their standing objections. These objections are largely, but not exclusively, concerned with the extensional adequacy of knowledge-first theories of justification. There are doubtless more ways to give knowledge priority in the theory of justified belief than are covered here, but the survey is instructive because it highlights potential shortcomings that would-be knowledge-first theorists of justification may wish either to avoid or else to be prepared with a suitable error theory. This entry concludes with a reflection about the extent to which the short history of, arguably, failed attempts to secure an unproblematic knowledge-first account of justified belief has begun to resemble the older Gettier dialectic. (shrink)

In a series of papers, 137–158; 1994, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 61–74, 1999) Fine develops his hylomorphic theory of embodiments. In this article, we supply a formal semantics for this theory that is adequate to the principles laid down for it in. In Section 1, we lay out the theory of embodiments as Fine presents it. In Section 2, we argue on Cantorian grounds that the theory needs to be stabilized, and sketch some ways forward, discussing various choice points (...) in modeling the view. In Section 3, we develop a formal semantics for the theory of embodiments by constructing embodiments in stages and restricting the domain of the second-order quantifiers. In Section 4 we give a few illustrative examples to show how the models deliver Finean hylomorphic consequences. In Section 5, we prove that Fine’s principles are sound with respect to this semantics. In Section 6 we present some inexpressibility results concerning Fine’s various notions of parthood and show that in our formal semantics these notions are all expressible using a single mereological primitive. In Section 7, we prove several mereological results stemming from the model theory, showing that the mereology is surprisingly robust. In Section 8, we draw some philosophical lessons from the formal semantics, and in particular respond to Koslicki’s main objection to Fine’s theory. In the appendix we present proofs of the inexpressibility results of Section 6. (shrink)

I show that the Lottery Paradox is just a version of the Sorites, and argue that this should modify our way of looking at the Paradox itself. In particular, I focus on what I call “the Cut-off Point Problem” and contend that this problem, well known by Sorites scholars, ought to play a key role in the debate on Kyburg’s puzzle. Very briefly, I show that, in the Lottery Paradox, the premises “ticket n°1 will lose”, “ticket n°2 will lose”… “ticket (...) n°1000 will lose” are equivalent to soritical premises of the form “~(the winning ticket is in {…, (tn)}) ⊃ ~(the winning ticket is in {…, tn, (tn + 1)})” (where “⊃” is the material conditional, “~” is the negation symbol, “tn” and “tn + 1” are “ticket n°n” and “ticket n°n + 1” respectively, and “{}” identify the elements of the lottery tickets’ set. The brackets in “(tn)” and “(tn + 1)” are meant to point out that in the antecedent of the conditional we do not always have a “tn” (and, as a result, a “tn + 1” in the consequent): consider the conditional “~(the winning ticket is in {}) ⊃ ~(the winning ticket is in {t1})”). As a result, failing to believe, for some ticket, that it will lose comes down to introducing a cut-off point in a chain of soritical premises. In this paper I explore the consequences of the different ways of blocking the Lottery Paradox with respect to the Cut-off Point Problem. A heap variant of the Lottery Paradox is especially relevant for evaluating the different solutions. One important result is that the most popular way out of the puzzle, i.e., denying the Lockean Thesis, becomes less attractive. Moreover, I show that, along with the debate on whether rational belief is closed under classical logic, the debate on the validity of modus ponens should play an important role in discussions on the Lottery Paradox. -/- . (shrink)

Kant has famously argued that monogamous marriage is the only relationship where sexual use can take place "without degrading humanity and breaking the moral laws." Kantian marriage, however, has been the target of fierce criticisms by contemporary things: it has been regarded as flawed and paradoncal, as being deeply at odds with feminism, and, at best, as plainly uninteresting. In this paper, I argue that Kantian marriage can indeed survive these criticisms. Finally, the paper advances the discussion beyond marriage. Drawing (...) on Kant 's conception of friendship, I suggest that he might have overlooked the possibility of sex being morally permissible in yet another context. (shrink)

Serious actualism is the prima facie plausible thesis that things couldn’t have been related while being nothing. The thesis plays an important role in a number of arguments in metaphysics, e.g., in Plantinga’s argument for the claim that propositions do not ontologically depend on the things that they are about and in Williamson’s argument for the claim that he, Williamson, is necessarily something. Salmon has put forward that which is, arguably, the most pressing challenge to serious actualists. Salmon’s objection is (...) based on a scenario intended to elicit the judgment that merely possible entities may nonetheless be actually referred to, and so may actually have properties. It is shown that predicativism, the thesis that names are true of their bearers, provides the resources for replying to Salmon’s objection. In addition, an argument for serious actualism based on Stephanou, 219–250 2007) is offered. Finally, it is shown that once serious actualism is conjoined with some minimal assumptions, it implies property necessitism, the thesis that necessarily all properties are necessarily something, as well as a strong comprehension principle for higher-order modal logic according to which for every condition there necessarily is the property of being a thing satisfying that condition. (shrink)

A frequent justification in the literature for using stated preference methods (SP) is that they are the only methods that can capture the so-called total economic value (TEV) of environmental changes to society. Based on follow-up interviews with SP survey respondents, this paper addresses the implications of that argument by shedding light on the construction of TEV, through respondents’ perspective. It illuminates the deficiencies of willingness to pay (WTP) as a measure of value presented as three aggregated themes considering respondents’ (...) unintentionality, their retraction once they understood that their WTP could be decisive in cost-benefit analysis and the inherent incompleteness of WTP. We discuss why the TEV discourse persists, how it conceals rather than reveals broader notions of value and in what ways our results support the development of alternative approaches that truly endorse plurality in environmental valuation and decision-making. (shrink)

This paper generalizes the (epistemic) preface paradox beyond the principle of belief aggregation and constructs a similar paradox for deontic reasoning. The analysis of the deontic case yields a solution strategy---restricting belief/obligation aggregation rather than giving it up altogether---that can be transferred to the epistemic case. Our proposal amounts to a reasonable compromise between two goals: (i) sticking to bridge principles between evidence and belief, such as the Lockean Thesis, and (ii) obtaining a sufficiently strong logic of doxastic and deontic (...) reasoning. (shrink)

The work of scientists and doctors in advancing genetic research and its applications has been accompanied by plenty of discussion in the popular press—from Good Housekeeping and Forbes to Ms. and the Congressional Record—about such ...

ABSTRACT Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories. We extend previous work on quantitative parsimony by offering an independent probabilistic justification for preferring the more quantitatively parsimonious theories in particular episodes of theory choice. Our strategy allows us to avoid worries that other considerations, such as pragmatic factors of computational (...) tractability and so on, could be the driving ones in the historical cases under consideration. _1_ Introduction _2_ Three Desiderata _2.1_ Limiting _2.2_ Robustness _2.3_ Breadth _2.3.1_ A limited success for Baker _2.3.2_ Rejecting Baker’s analysis _2.4_ The proposal _3_ Probabilistically Additive Hypotheses and a Bayesian Account: The Limpid Rationale Relativized and Reconsidered _3.1_ Neutrinos and beta decay _3.2_ Avogadro’s hypothesis _3.3_ Postulation of Neptune _4_ Conclusion. (shrink)

Sección I. Aportes desde las epistemologías feministas -- Sección II. Posturas éticas en las antropologías feministas -- Sección III. Protagonistas diversas, voces multisituadas -- Sección IV. La antropología y el feminismo: narraciones en primera persona sobre experiencias de investigación y docencia -- Sección V. Expresiones contemporáneas de la violencia.

In our rapidly changing environment, both profit and non-profit organizations confront an increasing demand for technological, economic, and social innovation. In response to this demand, organizations are taking on the role of “change agents” by transforming existing practices into innovative action. Libraries, as centers that accumulate and disperse knowledge, can support these organizations in their “change agent” roles. This paper delineates the way public libraries can help organizations meet the increasing need for external information associated with innovation. Policy issues concerned (...) with efficient information transfer to user organizationss are specified, and two concrete examples of information transfer systems are described. In order to best utilize existing knowledge,personal-professional assistance in selecting potentially innovative,impersonal written materials is recommended. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 10, October 2020, Page 32-33.

In this paper we claim that pragmatist philosophical practice is incompatible with scientistic philosophy. The kind of pragmatism used for making this case follows the spirit and method of philosophical pragmatists such as William James, John Dewey, Richard Rorty, and a related pragmatic tradition, Confucian Philosophy. Pragmatism starts from immediate experience, and refuses to cleave off the reality and salience of what is found in such experience in the process of thinking. Pragmatism also concerns itself with social problems, broadly conceived. (...) In contrast to this focus on immediate experience, the influence of science in much philosophizing involves a kind of scientism through which the relevance, value, and even reality of experience is brought into question. It also concerns itself with a narrowly defined set of so-called philosophical problems. In this regard, pragmatist philosophical practice is fundamentally opposed to scientistic philosophical practice. We will start by modelling the kind of philosophical practice that stems from pragmatism, and the role of immediate experience in it. Subsequently, we will introduce two modes of philosophizing that diminish if not negate the role of experience. One is bald naturalist philosophizing, and the other is a priori scientific philosophizing. In the last section, we will show how main commitments of both of these traditions are incompatible with a pragmatist philosophy that remains committed to the original impulse of pragmatism. (shrink)

At the heart of Kantian theory lies the prohibition against treating humanity merely as a means. Two of the most influential interpretations of what this means are Wood's and O'Neill's. Drawing on these thinkers' ideas, Kerstein formulates two accounts of what is involved in the idea of treating a person merely as a means: the and accounts. Kerstein's attempt is to show that they are problematic. He introduces his to alleviate the problems they face. I argue that the end-sharing and (...) possible consent accounts are not vulnerable to Kerstein's criticism. However, they both face a shortcoming: they fail to support the Kantian conclusion that the prostitute and the servile person are treated merely as means. Through reconstructing these accounts, I surmount this difficulty. Moreover, my proposal helps Kerstein's own account overcome a problem he admits it has, without the need to resort to consequentialism. (shrink)

Busca-se neste artigo problematizar a manifestação da colonialidade nas práticas pedagógicas de uma instituição de educação infantil situada em contexto periférico a partir da percepção de professoras e famílias. A argumentação e análise teórica adotada partem dos estudos da infância e teoria decolonial/contracolonial. Serão analisadas as conversas estabelecidas com adultos participantes da pesquisa, sendo quatro entrevistas realizadas com professoras e mães de crianças de uma instituição de educação infantil de contexto periférico e negro, localizada no município de Betim – MG. (...) A partir dos sujeitos da pesquisa são apresentadas denúncias que configuram o que chamamos de colonialidade da educação infantil. A alimentação das crianças foi destacada, pelas professoras e mães, como um dos momentos da rotina pedagógica que gerava grande incômodo devido a práticas de violência com as crianças. Esta violência compõe o que se denomina como adultocentrismo, que existe para posicionar as crianças às margens do projeto civilizatório ocidental, sendo que nestes termos o adultocentrismo pode ser também compreendido como a peste branca produzida pela matriz eurocêntrica e colonial. Atuar contra a colonialidade e contra o adultocentrismo é defender uma experiência concreta e histórica para a educação infantil e não apenas teórica. Cada vez mais é preciso avançar na formação das professoras de forma conscientizadora quanto a emergência da contracolonização da educação infantil em articulação com o projeto de sociedade emancipatória para todos e todas. (shrink)

Necessitism, Contingentism, and Theory Equivalence is a dissertation on issues in higher-order modal metaphysics. Consider a modal higher-order language with identity in which the universal quantifier is interpreted as expressing universal quantification and the necessity operator is interpreted as expressing metaphysical necessity. The main question addressed in the dissertation concerns the correct theory formulated in this language. A different question that also takes centre stage in the dissertation is what it takes for theories to be equivalent.The whole dissertation consists of (...) an extended argument in defence of the truth of two seemingly inconsistent higher-order modal theories, specifically: 1.Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, a theory based on Plantinga’s [1] modal metaphysics that is committed to, among other things, the contingent being of some individuals and the necessary being of all possible higher-order entities;2.Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, a theory advocated by Williamson [3] which is committed to, among other things, the necessary being of every possible individual as well as of every possible higher-order entity.Part of the case for these theories’ joint truth relies on defences of the following metaphysical theses: Thorough Serious Actualism, the thesis that no things could have been related while being nothing, and Higher-Order Necessitism, the thesis that necessarily, every higher-order entity is necessarily something. It is shown that Thorough Serious Actualism and Higher-Order Necessitism are both implicit commitments of very weak logical theories. The defence of Higher-Order Necessitism constitutes a powerful challenge to Stalnaker’s [2] Thorough Contingentism, a theory committed to, among other things, the view that there could have been some individuals as well as some entities of any higher-order that could have been nothing.In the dissertation it is argued that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are in fact equivalent, even if they appear to be jointly inconsistent. The case for this claim relies on the Synonymy account, a novel account of theory equivalence developed and defended in the dissertation. According to this account, theories are equivalent just in case they have the same commitments and conception of logical space.By way of defending the Synonymy account’s adequacy, the account is applied to the debate between noneists, proponents of the view that some things do not exist, and Quineans, proponents of the view that to exist just is to be some thing. The Synonymy account is shown to afford a more nuanced and better understanding of that debate by revealing that what noneists and Quineans are really disagreeing about is what expressive resources are available to appropriately describe the world.By coupling a metatheoretical result with tools from the philosophy of language, it is argued that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are synonymous theories, and so, by the lights of the Synonymy account, equivalent. Given the defence of their extant commitments made in the dissertation, it is concluded that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are both correct. A corollary of this result is that the dispute between Plantingans and Williamsonians is, in an important sense, merely verbal. For if two theories are equivalent, then they “require the same of the world for their truth.”Thus, the results of the dissertation reveal that if one speaks as a Plantingan while advocating Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, or as a Williamsonian while advocating Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, then one will not go wrong. Notwithstanding, one will still go wrong if one speaks as a Plantingan while advocating Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, or as a Williamsonian while advocating Plantingan Moderate Contingentism.On the basis of a conception of the individual constants and predicates of second-order modal languages as strongly Millian, i.e., as having actually existing entities as their semantic values, in the appendix are presented second-order modal logics consistent with Stalnaker’s Thorough Contingentism. Furthermore, it is shown there that these logics are strong enough for applications of higher-order modal logic in mathematics, a result that constitutes a reply to an argument to the contrary by Williamson [3]. Finally, these logics are proven to be complete relative to particular “thoroughly contingentist” classes of models. (shrink)